 |
|
 |
|
 |
|
 |
|
 |
|
Theory HFM
Views of a modular organisation of the brain are the trend. We don’t follow that trend.
Israel Rosenfield ("The invention of memory. A new view of the brain", New York, Basic Books, 1989)
writes: "Many, if not most of the psychologists and neuroscientists, are convinced nowadays that the brain consists of separate functional unities – called modules, which may be or may be not anatomically located", so that "our brain executes tasks by solving many independent problems, which altogether make up the general task.". " They have almost succeeded in creating a dogma."
In 1970 J.J.G. Prick (Dutch Handbook of Psychiatry, part 4, Van Loghum Slaterus) still thought that this viewpoint was outmoded. "The views in relation to the doctrine of functional localisation of the celebral cortex have been discarded in the present space of time. It is a general acknowledgement now that in the celebral cortex no psychical and bodily activities are located; and furthermore that as such they are not available" (page 357). "We remarked many times already that the human existence ‘makes’ its own celebral physiological organisation" … (page 364)
There are three research domains, in which the old-fashioned theory of modularity has popped again.
1. The clinical research of specific loss of function with well-defined brain damage.
2. The research in which the metaphore of ‘the brain as a computer’(formerly steam engine, telephone exchange et cetera) is simplistically used as a useful description of the real function of the brain.
3. The use of modern brain scan techniques, such as PET and fMRI (which produce nicely-coloured pictures) to find the places in the brain in which the functions of movement and cognition might be located.
A number of brain-researchers, whose names we have mentioned before, prove that the theory of modularity frequently accepted with open arms is wrong.
Very recently, in December 1999, F.H. Lopes da Silva, professor of neurobiology at Amsterdam, warned against these ideas (NOW/Huygens Lectures, the Hague).
Speaking about PET and fMRI he says:"….. can contribute to forming a static image of the brain as consisting of series of areas identified as ‘centers’ of cognitive functions, similar to what we see in the old pictures of the phrenology. In other words, the phrenology ghost looms in the background."(page 27)
Concerning vital behaviour we join in with the theories of G.M. Edelman. (After a first start in 1978, followed:
"Neutral Darwinism"in 1987,
"The remembered present" in 1989,
"Bright air, brilliant fire: on the matter of the mind" in 1991,and (together with G. Tononi) "A universe of consciousness" in 2000.)
We repeat here the sentence we wrote down in giving a description of the viewpoint of functionality:
"By means of unconscious, bodily experiences corresponding initially with evolutionary selected likes and dislikes, the subject has discovered and attached particular values and importance to its own environment."
Edelman speaks with that about the formation of ‘global mappings’ in the brain. Those ‘global mappings’ are indivisible complex meshworks in which cell groups everywhere in the brain always participate, in the cortex as well as in the midbrain, in the cerebellum and in the nuclei of the brain stem. Of essential importance with this are the numerous reciprocal connections between all those cell groups. Edelman calls this "reentry". The most important thing with this is that perception and movement in these global mappings are inextricably bound up with each other, in one functional dynamic system, in which on the one hand the way how to learn to perceive is dependent on the functions of movement and on the other hand the result of the perception defines the specifications of movement.
(There is positively and even necessarily a question of sometimes clearly located function- specialisations in the participating cell groups. However, there is no connection at all from that with shapes of behaviour. Those specifications can only lead to behaviour in so far they are linked in reciprocity with all other defined – may be or may be not - specialized domains, which are parts of the global mapping involved. So these specifications are not modules of behaviour; that is they don’t form separate parts of a puzzle, which on the condition that they are well-linked with each other, all of them together call up a specific picture of behaviour.")
Of great importance in the theory HBF are global mappings formed by learning those uncountable functions of posture and movement, which we execute automatically every day, such as walking, balancing, stooping, seizing, touching, cycling and so on. After the learning process the whole pattern of behaviour has been fixed in these mappings.
The tuning of all kinetic function-aspects has been attached to each other, at the same time complying with and corresponding to the important environment aspects to be perceived, so that the relation between body and environment as it were can be a symbiotic entirety. With this the perception is no longer analysing (so not this here and that there) and certainly not conscious. That which is perceived in a flash is not so much the structure of the environment itself, but the posture of the body corresponding to that environment.
In his latest book ("A universe of consciousness , page 186 -sqq) Edelman emphasizes that the mappings concerned, after a consciously guided learning process, no longer participate in the complex corticothalamic clusters, which are the base of conscious experiences. They are attached in the nuclei of the midbrain and the cerebellum in such a way that they can be activated from there. The consequence is that they are insulated from the level of consciousness. Therefore those routine actions can be entirely unconsciously executed as soon as they are called up from a conscious intention.
In "Neurosciences, a survey" written by B. van Cranenburgh, 1997, that same insulation is discussed. On page 153 we read: "With the adult human the palaeolevel (especially the basal ganglia: page 93 ) plays an important role in routine actions: complex behaviour patterns which can be executed absent-mindedly". On page 168 (also earlier on page 93 and 96) he speaks about ‘pattern generators’ in the basal ganglia for complex automated actions. Especially about the (many nuclei containing) striatum he says on page 272: "The projection of the human body in the primary motor cortex is to some extent to be found here. So the cortical organisation doesn’t get lost in the striatum." And as regards the kinetic tuning at those routine actions he remarks (page 168): "In the lowest (spinal) level all kinds of frequently used ‘links’ are ready: co-ordinative structures".)
Edelman writes about this ("A universe of consciousness", page 188): "The resulting functional insulation would be ideal for optimising the neural interactions within such circuits while reducing those with the rest of the brain."
With a persistent eccentric positionality that functional insulation is impaired and with it the attained ‘optimalisation’ disappears. Then there is as it were ‘broken in’ into these complicated meshworks, consequently the authentic perception is disturbed (because of the fact that there is paid attention to the wrong signals) and as a consequence of that the musculoskeletal system is wrongly used kinetically, while in the mean time (many times unconsciously) the insecurity keeps the stress apparatus in a state of alarm. In this way polymorphic somatic disorganisations develop fairy-rings which strengthen one another every time and again. Elements of these disorganisations are: dysfunctional muscular tension, dysfunctional position of skeletal segments, anomalies of tissues, autonomic reactions to it, disturbed celebral meshworks, hormonal deregulation (with which a disturbed endorphin-regulation may be of importance) . These effects of somatic disorganisation are functionally very drastic, but as for structure normally too small-scaled to be observed by the medical diagnostics by way of the usual apparatus or chemical analysis. In nosological terms there is ‘nothing to be found’ and often follows, for want of anything better, the diagnosis ‘psychosomatic complaint’ with all the dualistic interpretations linked to it.
By reactions from the tissues and skeletal segments on tactile communication-forms the therapist HBF has learned how to observe those effects of a persistent eccentric positionality.
It may be clear, that the therapy in the first place should be focused on that eccentric positionality and thus on the repairs of the possibility to function again in a centric positionality.